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Service providers of the cloud have witnessed a rapidly growing demand to provide
services to end-users in a timely manner. Security vulnerabilities against the cloud
infrastructure cannot be overlooked. Through exploitation of such weaknesses, the
adversary class may disrupt routine cloud operations, and have a debilitating ef-
fect on the reputation of the service provider. One attack type specifically aﬀecting
cloud services is the Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack. Through
such a malicious attack, the ability of the service provider to dynamically stretch
and accommodate increasing numbers of requests from end-users, is exploited, to
make it economically unviable for the service provider to sustain further demand
for service from legitimate end-users. In this work, we propose a novel and reac-
tive approach for controlling user requests for service, implemented at the cloud
xi
providers end, to mitigate the eﬀects of an imminent EDoS attack against criti-
cal cloud resources. Through this scheme, a limited access permission for cloud
services is granted to each user, based on three factors: Concurrent Requests Per
Second (CRPS), Random Check (RC), and User Trust Factor (UTF). We con-
duct real-world experiments to evaluate the proposed mitigation technique against
EDoS attack. The experimental results prove that the proposed approach is able
to detect and prevent such attack with low cost and overhead.
xii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has provided a novel paradigm to address the critical need for
aﬀordable and convenient resource availability to meet large-scale computing de-
mands of contemporary applications. The cloud paradigm provides various fea-
tures that are diﬀerent from traditional networks such as multi-tenancy, shared
resource pooling, on-demand network access, service orientation, dynamic resource
assignment, self-organization, and pay for use pricing model.
Cloud computing is based on the pay per use model, wherein, vendors and
service providers do not have to procure and maintain hardware and software
resources to sustain their respective computing activity. Rather, services (mostly
scalable) are purchased on a need basis.
1.1 Background and Terminology
The term cloud computing was inspired from the cloud character which is used to
represent the Internet [6]. Cloud computing as defined by NIST [7] is ”A model for
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on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources
that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management eﬀort or
service provider interaction.” In other words, cloud computing is a new paradigm
of computing in which on-demand network access, utility-based pricing (pay-for-
use pricing Model), and dynamic resource assignment are provided as a service
over the internet.
In cloud computing terminology, the term service provider refers to both in-
frastructure as well as generic service providers. Infrastructure providers manage
the platform and lease the resources according to a utility-based pricing. Service
providers rent the resources from Infrastructure providers and provide the services
to the end users [1], as shown in Fig 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Cloud bussiness model [1].
Three diﬀerent service models are defined for the cloud; Infrastructure as a
Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS),
as shown in Fig 1.2.
IaaS refers to providing storage and compute capabilities as services, usually
through spawning of Virtual Machines (VMs) based on cloud service provider de-
2
Figure 1.2: Cloud service models [1].
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mands. Amazon EC2 [8] is an example suite that is built on the IaaS service model.
PaaS provides a layer of software (e.g., Operating System) as a service for leasing
out to the service providers, to sustain design and deployment of application-layer
services. Google App Engine [9] is an example of a PaaS service model. Software
as a Service (SaaS) refers to provisioning of software based on end-user demand,
as a service over the Internet. Salesforce.com [10] is an examples of SaaS service
model.
Cloud computing can be classified into three types; public, private, and hybrid
clouds. In a public cloud, the resources are oﬀered through the Internet for public
use. In a private cloud, the resources are limited to one organization. Hybrid
cloud is a mix of public and private clouds [1] [11].
1.2 Auto-scaling
Auto-scaling is defined as a characteristic of the cloud that allows the service
provider to request for scaling up or down of cloud services (e.g., VMs) automati-
cally, to accommodate variable user demands, according to a predefined condition
(e.g., if CPU usage is greater than 80 % for one minute). Three parameters,
performance metric, threshold, and duration, are considered with the condition
to trigger the auto-scaling. Performance metric parameter is used to expose the
state of the cloud services. Threshold parameter defines the limit beyond which
if resource scaling is necessary, is achieved through the auto-scaling capability
of the cloud. Duration parameter is the period of time during which the auto-
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scaling condition is true to trigger the auto-scaling [12]. For example, assume
the CPU usage metric has been used to trigger the auto-scaling. The lower and
upper thresholds are set to 30% and 80% respectively. And the duration is set to
one minute. So, Whenever the CPU usage go beyond 80% for one minute, cloud
services will be scaled up. On the other hand, cloud services will be scaled down
when the CPU usage goes below 30% for one minute.
1.3 EDoS Attack
Through an EDoS attack, the attacker exploits the auto-scaling feature of the
cloud, to scale up the service provider’s resources (i.e., VMs). As a consequence,
this attack incapacitates the service provider from serving its users, as the cloud
providers billing system will charge the attacker operations to the cloud service
provider’s bill.
EDoS is defined as an attack that targets the service providers economic re-
sources by sending a huge number of requests (e.g, DDoS attacks) that appear to
be legitimate, exploiting the auto-scale feature of the cloud infrastructure [13][3].
We illustrate the EDoS attack in Fig 1.3. It is clear that when the attack takes
place, cloud service utilization increases, and similarly charges increase.
5
Figure 1.3: Eﬀect of an EDoS attack against the Cloud.
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1.4 Problem Statement
Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack is considered as one of the secu-
rity concerns that have hindered the migration of many organizations to the cloud
technology. This is because EDoS attacks impact targets the service provider (who
rents the resources from the cloud provider) and can cause financial losses. This
attack exploits the elasticity feature of the cloud by causing undue increases in
resource usage so as to accommodate false attacker demands. As a consequence
of pay-per-use model of the cloud, service provider will be charged for the attack-
ers activities. Ultimately, the economic viability of the service provider becomes
unsustainable.
A mitigation technique to identify suspicious service requests that targets the
service providers end, and mitigates the eﬀects of the EDoS attack through con-
trolled resource usage is proposed in this paper.
1.5 Motivation
According to a survey conducted by International Data Corporation (IDC) [2],
security is ranked as the greatest challenge for cloud computing, as shown in
Fig 1.4. Particular malicious attacks against the cloud, such as Economic Denial
of Sustainability (EDoS), have remained largely unaddressed in the literature.
The disruption of any service provisioned through the cloud can cause a large
scale damage to end-users comprising both novice private end-user applications
and sophisticated business applications wishing to harness the computing power
7
Figure 1.4: Cloud challenges survey [2]
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of the clouds elastic resource pool. Users of the cloud pay as they use, based
on application needs. Elasticity of resource availability at the service provider is
the key driving aspect for the growing popularity of the cloud paradigm. The
ability of the service provider to diﬀerentiate between legitimate and malicious
users/request types, is critical for smooth and aﬀordable resource usage at the
service providers end.
However, a comprehensive mechanism for identifying routine cloud usage ac-
tivity and distinguishing it from malicious activity, is largely unaddressed in the
literature.
1.6 Objective
The objective of this research is to propose a mitigation technique against EDoS
attack in cloud infrastructure. It should be able to detect and prevent such attack
with low overhead cost. For service providers, the technique cost should be less
than the expected cost due to the attack.
1.7 Contributions
In this section, we provide a list of contributions:
Some of the research work found in the literature for addressing EDoS and
DDoS attacks are summarized.
A novel and reactive approach is proposed to detect and mitigate the EDoS
9
attack in cloud systems with low overhead cost, based on a rate limit tech-
nique.
A scheme for detecting smart attackers is proposed using the RC factor, as
explained in Chapter 3.
The proposed scheme tracks the user behavior and avoids the false positives
based on the UTF factor, as explained in Chapter 3.
The proposed scheme skip checking the legitimacy of new users or legitimate
users (with UTF >0.25), as explained in at UTF subsection, who does not
break the CRPS or match the RC values.
1.8 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an extensive
analysis of the existing work done to identify and prevent distributed attacks
against the cloud. We provide an elaborate explanation of our proposed scheme
in Chapter 3. Experimental results and their analysis is presented in Chapter 4.
Finally, we provide conclusions and future directions for work in Chapter 5.
10
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we summarize research work found in the literature for addressing
distributed malicious attacks such as EDoS and DDoS against the cloud.
2.1 EDoS Attack
Khor and Nakao [14] proposed an approach ,sPoW , towards proving client com-
mitment through solving crypto-puzzles. The purpose of the scheme is to thwart
the eﬀects of an EDoS attack, by granting access to only those clients willing to
pay for service. Clients request for server access at the cloud provider’s end by
first defining the crypto-puzzle diﬃculty level, k, and subsequently requesting for
access. If an initial connection request is not successfully made during a given
frame of time, the client may request for a more diﬃcult puzzle to solve. Upon
succeeding in solving a puzzle of a given complexity, the server establishes a secure
communication channel for message exchange between the client and itself. sPoW
has several shortcomings such as asymmetric consumption power problem, puzzle
11
accumulation attack, and puzzle’s diﬃculty for false positives [3].
Sqalli et al [3] proposed a mitigation technique called EDoS-Shield to protect
the cloud against EDoS attacks. The key factor proposed for diﬀerentiating be-
tween legitimate and EDoS requests is through verification of human presence
to control an end-user machine. Fig. 2.1 shows the proposed architecture of the
EDoS-Shield mitigation technique. The Virtual Firewall (VF) and Verifier Node
operate in tandem to perform the EDoS mitigation tasks. The firewall filters in-
coming requests based on two lists, white list and black list. The verifier node
verifies the incoming requests using a Turing test, during first client access. If
a user passes the Turing test, its IP address will be held in the white list and
subsequent requests from the same IP address will be forwarded to the cloud
scheduler for providing necessary services. In contrast, if a user fails the Turing
test, its IP address will be held in the black list and subsequent requests from this
IP address will be dropped by the firewall. However, the proposed approach has
shortcomings. One of them is its vulnerability to IP spoofing. This problem might
cause an EDoS attack if an attacker spoofs an IP address belonging to the white
list of the verifier node. Another disadvantage is the false positives, in which the
EDoS-Shield may block an IP address that belongs to thousands of users due to
the misbehavior of one. Likewise, the problem of false negatives, in which a white
lister may change its behavior to harm the system.
Al-Haidari et al [15] proposed an enhanced version of the EDoS-Shield [3],
wherein, a Time-To-Live (TTL) field is appended alongside the IP address of
12
Figure 2.1: EDoS-Shield architecture [3].
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cloud service requests. Through such an approach, the authors attempt to thwart
the threat of spoofed IP addresses, as the distinctness in IP addresses when ac-
companied with a TTL field, will help diﬀerentiate malicious spoofing clients from
legitimate ones. Another scheme proposed to classify network traﬃc into anoma-
lous based on mean absolute variance of TTL values is provided in [16].
Kumar et al [17] have provided a contrast between traditional DDoS attacks
and EDoS attacks. The distinguishing point between the two is stated as follows:
while the former tends to deplete available resources to the end users, the latter
attempts to inflate the bill of the service provider through exploiting the property
of elasticity of cloud resources. The proposed scheme is an in-cloud EDoS mitiga-
tion web service comprising three modules, namely, packet filtering, proof-of-work
technique, and egress filtering. The clients of the cloud service must prove their
commitment for gaining service access by solving crypto puzzles. Only clients
succeeding in solving the crypto-puzzles are granted access to the cloud services.
The proposed scheme has some limitations such as puzzle accumulation attack
at the puzzle’s generation server. Also, the methods (i.e., modules) need more
clarification.
In-Cloud Scrubber [18] is a mitigation technique against EDoS attacks in the
cloud system. The primary function of In-Cloud Scrubber Service is to generate a
puzzle to check the legitimacy of the user for accessing the cloud service. The cloud
service is switched between two modes: normal and suspected, based on the server
and network bandwidth. In-Cloud Scrubber Service is used while the cloud service
14
is operating in the suspected mode. The incoming requests during the normal
mode will be immediately directed to the cloud service, whereas, the incoming
requests during the suspected mode will be directed to the In-Cloud Scrubber
Service for verification purpose. Client puzzles are known to provide weak access
guarantees to end-users [19], as malicious users with high computational power
may circumvent legitimate users from gaining access to cloud services. As a result,
legitimate users may be facing a debilitating waiting time before they are actually
guaranteed service. In-Cloud Scrubber idea is similar to that of In-Cloud eDDoS
Mitigation [17].
VivinSandar and Shenai [20] proposed an approach for ensuring that HTTP
and XML based DDoS attacks do not trigger the auto-scaling feature of the cloud,
thus ensuring that an EDoS does not transpire through such an attack. The
contribution mainly focuses on studying the ability of a DDoS attack through
protocol vulnerability exploitation, to cause an EDoS attack against the cloud.
Masood et el [4] proposed a mitigation technique called EDoS Armor against
EDoS attack for e-commerce applications in cloud environment. EDoS Armor
has dual defense system, the admission control and the congestion control, as
shown in Fig 2.2. The admission control is used to limit the number of users
client who are accessing the cloud services (i.e., web server) at the same time.
The congestion control is used to assign priority to the permitted clients based
on a browsing behavior learning mechanism. The learning mechanism is used
to classify the clients into good and bad, based on the client activities in the
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system. The challenge server is used to authenticate users into the system by
sending a challenge for each client at the beginning of the session. EDoS Armor
has some limitations. It contrasts the escalation feature of the cloud, in which the
simultaneous user requests for cloud service are limited by the admission control.
The average response time of the good clients is rather high. Moreover, some
users are unwilling to solve such challenge, because it contrasts with the purpose
of the web application [21][22].
A framework named DDoS-MS [23] is proposed to mitigate the eﬀect of the
EDoS attack in cloud system. The proposed framework enhance the work pro-
posed by Al-Haidari et al [15] in terms of the end-to-end delay. DDoS-MS mit-
igates the EDoS attack by testing the first two packets of the service requester.
Graphical Turing Test (GTT) and Crypto Puzzles are used for the testing pro-
cess. The former is used to test the packet, whereas, the latter is used to test the
packet’s source (e.g., the user). The proposed framework made up of a firwall to
filter packets based on a white and black lists, a verifier node and puzzle server
for verification process, a DNS server, green nodes to hide the location of the
protected cloud server, and a filtering router to forward the packets that come
from green nodes only. Problems such as false positives and false negatives are
still unaddressed using this mitigation system.
A mitigation technique called IPA-Defender is presented by Saini and Somani
[24]. IPA-Defender focuses on detecting and mitigating EDoS attack that targets
index page of any website, because it is provided freely and without authentication.
16
Figure 2.2: EDoS-Armor architecture [4].
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The Iptables is used to implement the scheme. The idea of the IPA-Defender is to
check each request for the index page. If the page count threshold of the requester
is crossed, IPA-Defender drops the request/subsequent requests of that requester,
and maintains its IP address in the blacklist for a period of time. The scheme
needs more description. Also, IPA-Defender might be feckless to detect fraud
requests that rely on the page count threshold. Moreover, the proposed scheme is
susceptible to the false positive problem.
Some of the EDoS mitigation techniques discussed earlier are summarized in
Table 2.1.
2.2 DDoS Attack
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks exploit the asymmetry between the
network line rate and server processing rate [25] to overwhelm server resources,
and circumvent legitimate clients from timely access to service.
In [26], an adaptive swarm-based scheme is presented. Specific network routes
are bound with specific client connections, and dismantled once the cloud-based
service is completely provided. Based on variations in the network terrain, the
route selected for a given client is modified. Certain connections, such as SSL,
are not supported, due to the stateless nature of the scheme. In [27], a traceback
mechanism is proposed for identifying perpetrators of DDoS attacks against the
cloud. A filtering technique is implemented to ensure that only legitimate packets
are seen through by the cloud virtual resources. It is also stated by the authors
18
Name Methodology Implementation Limitations
sPoW
Packet
matching
mechanism
and
crypto-puzzle
No
Asymmetric consumption
power problem
Puzzle accumulation attack
Puzzle’s diﬃculty for false
positives
EDoS-
Shield
Packet
filtering and
verification
Yes
IP spoofing
False positive problem
False negative problem
Enhanced
EDoS-
Shield
Packet
filtering and
verification
Yes False positive problem
False negative problem
In-Cloud
eDDoS
Mitiga-
tion
packet
filtering,
proof-of-work
technique,
and egress
filtering
No
Poor description about the
methods
Puzzle accumulation attack
Not implemented
In-cloud
Scrubber
Crypto-
puzzle
No
Similar to In-Cloud eDDoS
Mitigation
Puzzle accumulation attack
Not implemented
EDoS
Armor
Admission
control and
Congestion
control
Yes
Conflict with cloud’s escala-
tion feature
High response time of good
clients
Authentication request of
web applications
EDoS-MS
Packert
filtering and
verification
No
False positive problem
False negative problem
Not implemented
IPA-
Defender
Rate Limit Yes
A poor described scheme
Lack of detecting fraud re-
quests
False positive problem
Table 2.1: EDoS Mitigation Techniques Summary.
19
that when the server (or VM) capacity is not exceeded, even rogue packets are
served by the proposed scheme.
Other work related to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the cloud is
summarized as follows. In [28], the authors proposed a mechanism to detect and
mitigate the eﬀects of an HX-DoS attack, defined as a combination of HTTP
and XML messages, attempting to disrupt cloud activity. The proposed scheme,
namely, ENDER, is comprised of two previously proposed schemes, CLASSIE
[29], and Added Decision Making and Update (ADMU) [30][31]. Messages arriv-
ing at the cloud provider’s end are assessed by the CLASSIE analyzer, which is
located one hop away from the router or host. The ADMU component of the
proposed scheme makes a decision on whether to give access to a cloud resource
by computing a likelihood of a message, not previously classified, as constituting
an attack.
In [32], a network-level access control mechanism is proposed to prevent DoS
attacks against cloud resources. A cloud access manager (CAM) operates within
the proposed architecture. The CAM creates access zones. Zone 1 is implicit,
implying that if one member of the zone has access to a certain cloud resource,
others do as well. Moreover, cloud instances can be part of multiple zones simul-
taneously. Each zone has certain set of privileges. In addition, policies can be
added to the zones, for allowing further security controls.
In [33][?], a traﬃc analysis-based approach for identifying DoS attacks is pro-
posed. Statistical properties are extracted from network traﬃc based on multivari-
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ate correlation analysis. The scheme employs triangle areas to extract correlated
feature information from network traﬃc. In order to accurately identify DoS
traﬃc, a normal network traﬃc profile is defined through density estimations,
aforehand.
A Confidence-Based Filtering (CBF) method is proposed in [34]. CBF method
is investigated for filtering DDoS attack packets in cloud environment. Its process
needs two periods, non-attack period and attack period.During the non-attack
period, the CBF generates a nominal profile for the legitimate packets. The CBF
make use of the nominal profile to filter the illegitimate packets at attack period.
The authors of [35] propose a detection framework against DDoS attack in
cloud environment. The proposed framework relys on HTTP packet pattern and
rule engine in detecting DDoS attack. It made up of three modules, Packet and
Log Collection Module (PLCM), Pattern Analysis Module (PAM), and Detection
Module (DM). Parsing the packet transmission and web logs is main work of
PLCM. PAM is responsible for creating patterns that are used to detect DDoS
attack. DM is used to detect DDoS attack based on a normal behavior module.
A defense system against DDoS attack for web services in cloud system is pro-
posed in [36]. The proposed approach focuses o detecting two types of application
layer attacks, XML and HTTP DoS attacks. The idea is to extract features from
such attacks to build a normal request profile. Thus, this profile is used by the
outlier detection to detect suspicious requests. The DDoS defense system is suit-
able to be deployed in cloud environment to protect cloud providers and cloud
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brokers.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PROPOSED APPROACH
In this chapter, we present the proposed EDoS attack mitigation technique for
the cloud infrastructure. It is a reactive scheme that detects and mitigates the
eﬀects of an EDoS attack against the auto-scaling feature of the cloud, where
auto-scaling is defined as the characteristic of the cloud that allows the service
provider to request for scaling up or down of cloud resources, automatically, to
accommodate variable user demands.
The proposed approach make use of threshold parameter that accompanies
the auto-scaling conditions. Threshold value is a good indicator of the abnormal
behaviour as well as its importance to maintain the performance and save the
cost. Auto-scaling does not being triggered immediately when the threshold is
crossed. The threshold should be crossed for a period of time, as determined by
the duration parameter, to trigger the auto-scaling. This period of time enables
our scheme to mitigate EDoS attack eﬀects, to ensure that auto-scaling is triggered
only for legitimate requests. The scheme is a reactive, because it runs only when
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the threshold parameter is crossed.
3.1 The Architecture
The architecture of the proposed mitigation technique against EDoS attack is
shown in Fig. 3.1.
The main components of the architecture are the vFirewall and VMInvestiga-
tor. vFirewall is used to filter the traﬃc based on a black list, whereas, VMInves-
tigator checks the user legitimacy based on a turing test.
When the scheme runs (scale up threshold is crossed), all incoming requests are
redirected to the VMInvestigator for further check. Checking process is performed
by sending a Turing test to the user. The system tracks the user’s behavior. When
the user answers the test correctly, its request will be passed to the cloud and its
trust will be increased, and vice versa. A detailed inner working of the proposed
scheme is provided in Fig. 3.2.
The distinct components of the architecture are elaborated below:
3.1.1 vFirewall:
Is a front-end filtering device responsible for analyzing the incoming requests to
the cloud services. Those requests found to be originating from black-listed users,
as imposed by predefined firewall rules, are processed accordingly. Typical exam-
ples of firewall filtering include: Dropping requests originating from specific IP
addresses, Port Numbers, Destined for specific IP addresses and Port Numbers.
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Figure 3.1: The proposed architecture of EDoS mitigation technique
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Figure 3.2: EDoS Mitigation Scheme in Action
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Advanced firewall versions also perform payload analysis for deep-level under-
standing of sophisticated attacks that may target the cloud provider resources.
However, for the proposed architecture, the vFirewall does not drop any requests
from IP addresses found in the black list, rather directs these to the VM Investi-
gator, for further processing.
3.1.2 Load Balancer:
Does scheduling of jobs that arrive from the vFirewall or from VMIvestigator.
These jobs are distributed evenly based on several techniques for job scheduling
proposed in the literature, such as those found in [37][38][39][40].
Also, Load Balancer (e.g., Citrix NetScaler) is responsible for auto-scaling and
monitoring its parameters in conjunction with the cloud platform software (e.g.,
Citrix CloudPlatform). Moreover, It adds a rule to the vFirwall that directs
all incoming requests to the VMInvestigator, when the auto-scaling condition
threshold is crossed.
3.1.3 Data Base (DB):
This component of the proposed architecture is mainly used by the rate limit tech-
nique which is implemented by the VMInvestigator. It has two tables, Ratelimit
and Blacklist.
Rate limit table is used to track the past behaviour of users. This table includes
five fields, IP, LastActivity, RequestsCount, UTF, and Count. IP represents the
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user identity. LastActivity keeps the last seen of a certain user in the system.
RequestsCount keeps the user’s requests number per minute. UTF denotes for
User Trust Factor, which is explained in the VMInvestigor section. And Count is
used to keep the user’s requests per second.
Blacklist table stores the IP addresses of the malicious users. These IP ad-
dresses are a copy of those held in the black list of the vFirewall. The purpose of
this replication is to provide a fast access to these IP addresses for the VMInves-
tigator, because the DB is located at the same machine as the VMInvestigator.
3.1.4 VMInvestigator:
The purpose of the VMInvestigator is to check the user legitimacy based on a
Turing test. It implements a rate limit (i.e. rate control) technique that provides
a controlled access to subsequent service requests from end-users, to prevent in-
discriminate resource allocation to malicious users that are perpetrating an EDoS
attack.
Incoming request is directed to the VMInvestigator in two cases, either when
the IP address of this request is held in the black list of the vFirewall, or when
the auto-scaling (i.e., scale up) condition threshold is crossed. Fig. 3.3 illustrates
how the incoming requests are processed at VMInvestigator.
Rate Limit
Rate Limit technique is used to control the access of the cloud services and re-
duce the overload of the VMInvestigator. Through this technique, a limited ac-
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cess permission for cloud services is granted to each user, based on three factors,
Concurrent Requests Per Second (CRPS), Random Check (RC), and User Trust
Factor (UTF).
Concurrent Requests Per Second (CRPS): CRPS means how many re-
quests are permitted from a single IP address during a second. Breaching the
CRPS is determined by checking the Count and LastActivity fields of the user.
For instance, assume CRPS is set to 5, which mean the system allows 5 requests
per second, the system initially checks the Count field of a user. So, when the
sixth request (>5) of that user access the system, the time diﬀerence between
the current time and LastActivity of the user is checked. The user breaches the
CRPS, if the time diﬀerence is less than a second. If the time diﬀerence is more
than a second, Count is rest to 1.
Random Check (RC): RC is used to help in detecting smart attackers, who
can subvert the system by sending requests based on the CRPS value ( i.e., as-
suming the attacker knows the CRPS value). RC values are taken from the inerval
[1,TRPM], and its count (RC values count) is same as the CRPS value. TRPM
stands for Total Requests Per Minute, and its value equals CRPS*60.
Smart attackers can subvert the system by sending same requests as allowed
by the system or less. VMInvestigator selects the RC values randomly. So, in case
of sending less requests than what is allowed by the system, it is expected that
the random check may not take place while the RC value(s) are aligned to the end
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of the interval (i.e, [1,TRPM]). To avoid such situation, the interval [1,TRPM] is
divided equally into sub-intervals (if CRPS > 1), based on the RC values count.
And hence, VMInvestigator picks an RC value from each interval. For instance,
if CRPS is set to 3, RC values count will be 3, TRPM will be 180, and the RC
values will be taken from the interval [1,180]. Since RC values count is 3, the
interval [1,180] will be divided into 3 sub-intervals, [1,60], [61,120], and [121,180].
therefore, VMInvestigator picks an RC value from each interval randomly.
RC values count and TRPM are directly proportional to the CRPS value.
For example, if CRPS is set to 1, RC will be one value and TRPM will be 60.
VMInvestigator counts the user’s requests per minute. When the request number
that matches the RC value(s) access the VMInvestigator, this check takes place.
VMInvestigator rests user’s requests count (identified by the RequestsCount field)
to 0 every minute. Also, RC values are changed by the VMInvestigator periodi-
cally, using a Cron job .
User Trust Factor (UTF): UTF is used to track the past behavior of users
who visit the system. UTF value is initiated at the VMInvestigator when a request
from a new user with a certain IP address passes the VMInvestigator. The default
value of UTF is 0.5, where UTF value belongs to the interval [0,1]. UTF is
classified into three levels, good, average, and bad UTF [41]. The interval of
good UTF, average UTF, and bad UTF are (0.75-1], [0.25-0.75], and [0-0.25)
respectively.
UTF value is aﬀected by the Turing test. If a user fails (e.g., given a wrong
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answer or is timed out) the test, UTF value is reduced by 0.02. If it passes the test,
UTF value is incremented by 0.01. To penalize the failure users, UTF increment
should be less than the UTF decrement [42]. This is because test failure is an
indicator of the attack.
VMInvestigator checks the UTF value of all users periodically. Users with bad
UTF are marked as malicious users, and as a consequence, their IP addresses are
held in the black list of the vFirewall. Users with good UTF are removed from
the black list (if they are in the black list).
It is noticed from Fig. 3.3 that, VMInvestigator firstly checks if the user violates
the CRPS condition. If yes, then its UTF is checked. The purpose of this step
is to give a chance for the false positives (e.g., legitimate requests from diﬀerent
users have a shared IP address coming at the same time). If the UTF is less than
0.25 (i.e., bad UTF), then VMInvestigator drops the request. If the UTF is more
than 0.25, a chance is granted for the user to get the cloud service when passing
the Turing test. UTF value is incremented by 0.01 in case of passing the test,
whereas, it is reduced by 0.02 in case of failing the test.
If the user does not break the CRPS, VMInvestigator checks if the request
number matches the RC value(s). The purpose of this step is to detect smart
attackers. For example, an attacker knows that the system allows only 1 req/sec
(CRPS==1) for each user, and it subverts the system from multiple machines (e.g,
zombies) by sending the same rate (1 req/sec) or less (2 req/sec) per machine.
Assuming each machine has a diﬀerent identity (IP address) and it is new to the
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Figure 3.3: VMInvetigator workflow.
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system (i.e., UTF=0.5), all requests from these machines will be directed to the
cloud services. To solve this problem, Turing Test is sent to each machine while
the request number matches the RC value(s). Failing the test, causing a reduction
of the UTF value, which in turn will prevent from getting the service directly. By
the way, RC is not one value, it depends on the CRPS, if CRPS = 5, RC will be
5 values from the interval [1,(5*60)].
UTF value is checked again when the user does not violate the CRPS condition,
to prevent the bad users (e.g., black listers such as botnet) of getting the service
directly.
If the user is new visitor to the system, its information is stored in the Rate-
Limit table of the DB, and its request is directed to the cloud services.
3.2 Implementation
In this section, we illustrate who is responsible for implementing the proposed
EDoS attack mitigation technique and how it is implemented. The proposed mit-
igation technique needs to check the auto-scaling condition thresholds to start
running the scheme. Auto-scaling feature is managed by the cloud provider.
Therefore, cloud provider is recommended to implement (i.e., oﬀer) the EDoS
mitigation technique as a security feature for service providers.
To build the cloud, we use two servers, management server and compute server.
The management server is used to manage the cloud services. Citix CloudPlatform
3.0.5 is the software that is installed on the management server. Citix CloudPlat-
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form 3.0.5 is running on CentOS 6.2. Compute server or the hypervisor contains
the cloud services in the form of VMs. Citrix XenServer 6.0.2 is the software that
represents the hypervisor.
Citrix NetScaler VPX 10.e is used to implement the Load Balancer. Its in-
stalled as a VM running on Citrix XenServer 6.0.2 of a machine. Least connection
algorithm is used by the load balancer to distribute the traﬃc flow, as shown in
Fig. 3.4. To implement auto-scaling, Citrix NetScaler 10.e is used in conjunction
with Citrix CloudPlatform 3.0.5.
Two machines running CentOS 6.4 are used to implement the vFirewall and
VMInvestigator. PHP scripts and Cron jobs are used to implement the rate limit
technique of the VMInvestigator. Cron job is a linux command that runs tasks
(e.g, commands, scripts) at specific date and time. It is used by the VMInvesti-
gator to periodically execute PHP scripts such as the one that is responsible for
reset the RequestCount value of the users, the one that is checks users’ UTF, and
the one that picks the RC values. Mysql is used to implement the DB.
In our implementation, we add a component called VMObserver to check the
auto-scaling condition thresholds of the cloud services. Checking the thresholds
work is done by the Citrix NetScaler to trigger the auto-scaling, whereas, it is done
by the VMObserevr to run the EDoS attack mitigation technique. So, if Citrix
NetScaler checks the thresholds for both works, VMObserver becomes useless and
being removed, as we shown in Fig. 3.1. Also, due to inability to control the Citrix
NetScaler, VMInvestigator takes care of adding the rule at vFirewall that directs
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Figure 3.4: Load balancing method [5].
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all the requests to the VMInvestigator when auto-scaling threshold is crossed.
VMObserver conducts a periodic check of the auto-scaling conditions thresh-
olds, as stipulated at initialization time by the service provider. VMObserver is
instantiated within each VM of the cloud services and within the VMInvestigator.
The VMObserver, initiated within the VM of cloud services, performs a self
monitoring of the auto-scaling conditions thresholds, and sending the statistics to
the DB, as illustrated in Fig. 3.5. The VMObserver, initiated within the VMIn-
vestigator, checks the auto-scaling conditions thresholds from the DB. If they are
crossed, the mitigation technique starts running.
We implement the VMObserver using a PHP script. This script is executed
periodically using a Cron job. Threshold and polling interval of the VMObserver
is set based on the auto-scaling configuration of the service provider.
EDoS attack is implemented using Jmeter. Eight VMs with diﬀerent IP ad-
dresses are used to initiate the attack.
Cloud services are implemented using Apache web server. Apache is initiated
automatically during the VM startup.
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Figure 3.5: The implemented architecture of EDoS mitigation technique.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this chapter, we illustrate the experimental setup of the proposed mitigation
technique against EDoS attack. Also, we present and discuss the experimental
results obtained from implementing the EDoS attack against the cloud services
with/without the proposed mitigation technique.
4.1 Experiments Setup
Experiments have been conducted to evaluate the proposed mitigation technique
and demonstrate the eﬀect of the EDoS attack against cloud services. Table 4.1
shows the parameters that have been used in the experiments.
CPU usage metric has been used to scale up or scale down the cloud services.
The upper and lower thresholds of auto-scaling were set to 80% and 30% respec-
tively. The average CPU usage metric is checked every minute according to the
polling interval parameter. The duration of the scale up or scale down is set to 1
minute. The aforementioned parameters except the auto-scaling lower threshold
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Prameter Value
Auto-scaling metric CPU usage
Auto-scaling upper threshold 80%
Auto-scaling lower threshold 30%
polling interval 60 sec
Duration 60 sec
Min VM instances 3
Max VM instances 10
VM instance type Small
VM instance cost 0.03
VM instance OS CentOS 5.6 (64-bit)
Web server Apache
Legitimate load 40%
Table 4.1: Experiment parameters.
parameter are set based upon [43]. If the average CPU usage of the VM instances
that represents the cloud services is more than 80 percent for 1 minute, one VM
instance will be added. In contrast, if the average CPU usage of the VM instances
is less than 30 percent for 1 minute, one VM instance will be terminated.
The minimum and maximum number of VM instances are set to 3 and 10
respectively, as it is the default value of Citrix CloudPLatform. The compute
oﬀering or VM instance type is set to small. Such a VM instance has 1 CPU
core with 500 MHz and 512 MB memory. Its price is assumed to be 0.03, based
upon the Wowrack pricing policy [44]. The VM instance Operating System (OS)
is CentOS 5.6 (64-bit), since it is the default template of Citrix CloudPlatform.
We installed Apache version 2.2.3 in each VM instance to run the web application
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(cloud service). Based on the study of Google trace [45], we have generated a
fixed load that consumes about 40% of the CPU usage of the cloud services using
Jmeter. In this case, Scale down does not add any value to the detector system
and is therefore not triggered. This is because the EDoS attack exploits the scale
up feature of the cloud.
VMInvestigator updates the RC value(s) every five minutes. Also, it checks
the users’ UTF every minute.
4.2 Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of four diﬀerent scenarios
to evaluate the proposed mitigation technique against EDoS attacks at service
provider’s end. The attackers are assumed to be first time visitors to the system.
We choose the results once a steady state is achieved during the experiments.
Each experiment is repeated ten times.
4.2.1 Without Auto-scaling andMitigation Technique Sce-
nario
In this scenario, we disable the auto-scaling and mitigation technique. Fig. 4.1
illustrates the eﬀect of the EDoS attack against the CPU usage of the cloud
services. It is noted that, the increase in the attack rate increases the CPU usage
until it reaches a maximum value at 400 request(s) per second (rps) of the attack
rate. Eventually, the cloud services are made unavailable for all the users.
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Figure 4.1: EDoS attack eﬀect against CPU usage of the cloud services, without
auto-scaling and mitigation technique
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Fig. 4.2 shows the eﬀect of the EDoS attack against the memory allocation of
the cloud services. The memory allocation is about 130 and 136 MB at 0 and 200
respectively of the attack rate. A significant increase of the memory allocation is
noticed at 400 rps of the attack rate, since the CPU usage of the cloud services
is fully utilized. After that, increasing the attack rate is accompanied by a minor
increase in the memory allocation.
Fig 4.3 illustrates the eﬀect of the EDoS attack on the throughput. NetScaler
UI is used to obtain the throughput within the cloud. It is noted that the through-
put is exponential to the attack rate. At 400 rps of the attack rate, the system is
unable to handle more requests because of the maximum utilization of the cloud
resources (i.e., CPU usage).
4.2.2 With Auto-scaling but without Mitigation Technique
Scenario
In this scenario, the auto-scaling is enabled but the mitigation technique is dis-
abled. Fig. 4.4 shows the eﬀect of the EDoS attack against the CPU usage of
the cloud services. The number of VMs are scaled up from 3 to 4 at 400 rps of
the attack rate. It means that the CPU usage goes beyond 80 percent when the
attack rate is increased from 200 to 400 rps. Similarly, at 600 rps of the attack
rate, the number of VMs are scaled up to 6. The VMs continue to scale up to
accommodate the demand until they reach the maximum number (i.e., 10 VMs)
at 1200 rps of the attack rate. The CPU usage fluctuates between 60 percent and
42
Figure 4.2: EDoS attack eﬀect against memory allocation of the cloud services,
without auto-scaling and mitigation technique
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Figure 4.3: EDoS attack eﬀect against throughput of the cloud services, without
auto-scaling and mitigation technique
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80 percent due to the auto-scaling before it reaches the peak at 1400 rps of the
attack rate.
EDoS attack eﬀect on the memory allocation is illustrated in Fig. 4.5. Memory
utilization fluctuates around 129 MB until the VM instances reaches its peak at
1200 of the attack rate. EDoS eﬀect on the throughput is clarified in Fig. 4.6. It
is noted that throughput grows when the VM instances grow, before the former
reaches its peak at 1400 rps of the attack rate.
4.2.3 With Auto-scaling and Mitigation Technique Sce-
nario
In this scenario, both the auto-scaling and mitigation technique are enabled.
Fig. 4.7 shows the eﬀect of the EDoS attack against the CPU usage of the cloud
services. It may be noted that the CPU usage fluctuated around 40 percent which
represents the legitimate usage. Also, the auto-scaling does not take place and
the number of VMs remain constant. These results indicate the eﬀectiveness of
the proposed approach in mitigating the EDoS attack.
Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.8 shows the eﬀect of the EDoS attack on the Memory and
throughput respectively. It is noted that the technique succeeds to mitigate the
EDoS attack, as both the memory utilization and throughput remain the same.
The cost associated with the cloud services is illustrated in Fig. 4.10. The
base case of the VM instances number is three, as stated in Table 4.1. Each VM
instance costs 0.03 per hour. The results show that, implementing the mitiga-
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Figure 4.4: EDoS attack eﬀect against CPU usage of the cloud services, with
auto-scaling but without mitigation technique
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Figure 4.5: EDoS attack eﬀect against CPU usage of the cloud services, with
auto-scaling but without mitigation technique
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Figure 4.6: EDoS attack eﬀect against CPU usage of the cloud services, with
auto-scaling but without mitigation technique
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Figure 4.7: EDoS attack eﬀect against CPU usage of the cloud services, with
auto-scaling and mitigation technique
49
Figure 4.8: EDoS attack eﬀect against CPU usage of the cloud services, with
auto-scaling and mitigation technique
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Figure 4.9: EDoS attack eﬀect against CPU usage of the cloud services, with
auto-scaling and mitigation technique
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tion technique requires an additional cost as compared to the optimal case. The
additional cost of the mitigation technique is a result of the VMInvestigator and
vFirewall costs (i.e., 2 VM instances cost). However, the cost increases dramat-
ically and then levels out when the VM instances reach the peak (i.e., 10 VM
instances) at 1200 rps of the attack rate, in the case of no mitigation technique.
It is beyond any doubt that the cost will be continued to increase unless the VM
instances that represents the cloud services are not limited by a maximum value.
Fig. 4.11 shows the results of the response time for services running in the
cloud. We used an integrated tool with Firefox named Firebug [46], to measure
the response time of the request. The request, that measures the response time,
accesses the Load balancer directly in the optimal case. In the other cases, it
goes through the vFirewall then to the load balancer. It may be noted that the
response time with mitigation technique in action roughly stays the same, and its
value is close to the optimal value. However, the response time without mitigation
technique is stable especially when the scale up of the VM instances still occurs.
After that, the response time increases considerably, because the VM instances
that represents the cloud services reach their peak. The response time is about
93 ms when the mitigation technique is in action.
4.2.4 Smart Attacker Scenario
In this scenario, we assume that the attacker is new to the system, and knows
the CRPS value and subverts the system based on it. The idea of this scenario is
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Figure 4.10: EDoS attack eﬀect on the cost
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Figure 4.11: EDoS attack eﬀect on the response time
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similar to the Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) attack [47]. For example,
an attacker is sending 1 rps or less when the CRPS is set to 1, which mean the
system allows only one request per second. The configuration of this scenario is
set based on Table 4.1.
In Fig. 4.12, we set the CRPS to 1, and only one malicious user subverts the
system by sending 1 rps (e.g., 60 requests per minute). The RC values count is
one, since CRPS is one, and the RC value is 39 (selected randomly by VMInvesti-
gator). The results show how many malicious requests accessing the cloud services
per minute, and when the proposed mitigation technique succeeds to stop them.
It is noted that, the illegitimate requests (false negatives) for the UTF decrement
of 0.1 for minute 1 is around 36, and 0 at minute 2. So, for minute 1, the tech-
nique was able to stop about 24 requests out of a total of 60 requests from getting
through. Given the setup values of that experiment, there could be at most 1 re-
quest out of 60 requests that matched the selected RC value and challenged with
the Turing Test, whereas the remaining 23 requests that were blocked must have
violated the CRPS condition and were either challenged with the Turing Test if
the UTF is > 0.25 (at most 3 requests out the remaining 23 requests as these 3
requests will reduce the UTF to below 0.25), or dropped right away since their
UTF is < 0.25. For the UTF decrement of 0.05, about 58 and 38 of the malicious
requests passed to the cloud at minute 1 and 2 respectively. At minute 3, the
mitigation technique succeeds in stopping these requests. At most 6 requests will
reduce the UTF to below 0.25, in case of not answering the Turing Test. For
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the UTF decrement of 0.02, the illegitimate requests fluctuates around 57 until
minute 4. Its clear that the technique succeeds in stopping 3 requests out of 60.
One of the 3 requests is stopped due to the Turing Test that is sent to the user
because of matching the selected RC value. The other 2 requests are stopped
due to the Turing Test that is sent because of breaching the CRPS value where
some requests are delayed and come at the time frame of the next requests. The
mitigation technique succeeds in stopping these requests at minute 6.
Fig. 4.13 shows the corresponding UTF value of the requester for previous
scenario (CRPS=1). It is noted that the requester’s UTF falls substantially for
UTF decrement 0.1 and 0.05. It goes from 0.5 to 0 at minute 2, for the UTF
decrement of 0.1, whereas, it goes from 0.5 to 0.38 and then from 0.38 to 0
at minute 2 and 3 respectively. The rquester’s UTF falls gradually of the UTF
decrement of 0.02. About 0.06 is deducted from the user’s UTF During the minute,
until it reaches 0 at minute 6. As we mentioned early, The UTF deduction is a
result of not answering the Turing test that is send due to the Random Check, or
due to breaching the CRPS value.
Fig. 4.14 shows the result of the false negatives when CRPS is set to 5, and the
attacker sends 5 rps. The RC values are 31, 62, 149, 225, and 263. It is noted that,
about 292 and 148 malicious requests (false negatives) access the cloud services
at minute 1 and 2 respectively, for UTF decrement of 0.02. At minute 1, the
technique succeeds to stop 8 requests out of the 300 that are getting through the
system. 5 of them are stopped due to the Turing Test that is send as a result of
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Figure 4.12: Plot shown the experimental results of the false negatives with time
for CRPS = 1.
57
Figure 4.13: Plot shown the experimental results of the UTF value with time for
CRPS = 1.
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matching the selected RC values, whereas, the other are stopped due to Turing
test that is sent as a result of violating the CRPS factor. At minute 2, 152 out
of 300 are blocked by the technique. The degradation of the UTF value under
0.025 During this minute, results in detecting these large number of requests, as
shown in Fig 4.15. The technique succeeds to stop these requests at minute 3. At
minute one, there are 219 and 149 malicious requests accessing the cloud for UTF
decrement of 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. At minute two, the proposed mitigation
technique get rid of these malicious requests.
Its expected that the attacker can send less number of requests than what
are permitted to subvert the system. Fig 4.16 shows the result of the malicious
requests that access the cloud services, when the attacker sends 4 rps, and CRPS
is set to 5. For UTF decrement of 0.02, 236 illegitimate requests out of 240 access
the cloud at the minutes 1, 2, 3, and 4. It is clear that the four requests are
detected because of the Turing Test that sent to the user as a result of matching
the selected RC values. The benefit of dividing the main interval 1,TRPM=300
and picking each RC value from a diﬀerent interval is manifested in such scenario,
since its expected that the random check may not take place in case of selecting
values from the end of the interval [1,300]. The CRPS does not provide any benefit
in such scenario. The illegitimate requests for minute 5 are about 30, and 0 for
minute 6. For UTF decrement of 0.05, there are 236 and 61 of the malicious
requests accessing the cloud at minutes 1 and 2 respectively. The system stops
these requests at minute 3. The illegitimate requests for the UTF decrement of
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Figure 4.14: Plot shown the experimental results of the false negatives with time
for CRPS = 5.
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Figure 4.15: Plot shown the experimental results of the UTF value with time for
CRPS = 5.
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Figure 4.16: Plot shown the experimental results of the false negatives with time,
when the attacker sends less requests than allowed by the system for CRPS = 5.
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0.1, for minute 1 is 149, and 0 for minute 2.
Fig 4.17 shows the corresponding UTF of the requester when it sends less re-
quests (4 rps) than allowed by the system (5 rps). It is noted that the user’s UTF
is deducted by 0.08 during each of the first three minutes, for the UTF decre-
ment of 0.02. During the minute 4, the user’s UTF falls substantially (because
UTF<0.25) until it reaches 0 at minute 5. The UTF value of the requester for
the UTF decrement of 0.05, decreases from 0.5 to 0.42 and then from 0.42 to 0,
during the minutes 1 and 2 respectively. It goes from 0.5 to 0 during the first
minute for the UTF decrement of 0.1.
Fig 4.18 shows the result of false negatives, when the attacker sends more
requests than allowed by the system. In this scenarion, we set the CRPS to 5,
and the attacker sends 6 rps. It is noted that, the mitigation technique succeeds
to stop the malicious requests during the first minute, for all values of the UTF
decrement. About 53, 30, and 15 malicious requests accessing the cloud for UTF
decrement of 0.02, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively. Breaching the CRPS is undoubtedly
the main reason of detecting these requests more quickly. The corresponding UTF
of this scenario is demonstrated in Fig 4.19. At minute 2, the requester’s UTF is
0 for each value of the UTF decrement.
Fig 4.20 shows the result of the malicious requests when CRPS is set to 10,
and the attacker sends 10 rps. RC values are 18, 81, 140, 214, 292, 357, 415, 446,
528, and 592. We can notice about 580, 291, and 139 malicious requests accessing
the cloud during the first minute, for the UTF decrement of 0.02, 0.05, and 0.1
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Figure 4.17: Plot shown the experimental results of the UTF value with time,
when the attacker sends less requests than allowed by the system for CRPS = 5.
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Figure 4.18: Plot shown the experimental results of the false negatives with time,
when the attacker sends more requests than allowed by the system for CRPS =
5.
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Figure 4.19: Plot shown the experimental results of the UTF value with time,
when the attacker sends less requests than allowed by the system, CRPS = 5.
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respectively. The corresponding UTF is illustrated in Fig 4.21. As we mentioned
earlier, the requester’s UTF value falls substantially due to the failure of answering
the Turing Test that is sent due to matching the RC value or breaching the CRPS
value.
In Fig 4.22, we scale the malicious users to 10, 50, and 100 based on the results
obtained from Fig 4.12 for the UTF decrement of 0.02. During each of the first
three minutes, about 570, 2850, and 5700 malicious requests accessing the cloud
for malicious users of 10, 50, and 100 respectively. At minute 4, these malicious
requests go down until they are stopped at minute 6. Moreover, we study the eﬀect
of these requests on the CPU usage of the cloud services, as shown in Fig. 4.23.
We can notice that, the CPU usage of the cloud services fluctuates around 70, 60,
and 45 percent for malicious users of 100, 50, and 10 respectively.
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Figure 4.20: Plot shown the experimental results of the false negatives with time
for CRPS = 10.
68
Figure 4.21: Plot shown the experimental results of the UTF value with time for
CRPS = 10.
69
Figure 4.22: False negatives result of multiple users.
70
Figure 4.23: The eﬀect of false negatives from multiple users on CPU usage.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
A novel reactive scheme has been proposed to provide fair control for cloud re-
source access by end-users, in the event of an EDoS attack. Through this scheme,
a limited access permission for cloud services is granted to each user, based on
three factors, Concurrent Requests Per Second (CRPS), Random Check (RC),
and User Trust Factor (UTF). The scheme is comprised of several components,
namely, vFirewall, Load balancer, DB, and VM Investigator, operating hand in
hand, to control access to cloud services, for mitigating the eﬀects of an EDoS
attack. None of the requests that surpass the defined thresholds of these factors,
are dropped, but rather, the users are provided with a Turing test to get an op-
portunity for accessing the cloud services. By analyzing the results obtained from
the real-world experiment of the proposed scheme, it is evident that the eﬀect of
the EDoS attack mitigated when the access to the cloud resources is controlled
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over a stretch of time. Moreover, the user perceived delays imposed through the
scheme were found to be minimal.
As part of our future work, we intend to further analyze our proposed scheme,
and its performance when service provider network-level parameters are varied.
In addition, we intend to implement diverse application scenarios, and study the
schemes performance for each.
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